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The implementation of different forms of public aids for industrial companies is standard practice in all countries to 
promote economic development and job creation. This study presents a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of different 
instruments for public aid to industrial companies. Using a wide sample of Spanish companies that have received four types 
of public aid, it has been possible to verify the effect of each of the public aid on the evolution of the companies´ efficiency. 
The results obtained suggest that the participative loan is the instrument that improves the efficiency of companies 
significantly. 
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Introduction 
Economic and financial aid to companies has 
traditionally been part of the industrial policies 
promoted by the governments of all countries.
1
 To 
contribute to economic development and job creation, 
subsidies, guarantees, equity participation or loans 
with special payment conditions have been used to 
help companies improve their financial performance. 
The previous literature on the evaluation of 
these public policies has addressed different issues, 
frequently associated with the activities of the 
company. For example, the impact of public aid in the 
area of Research and Development (R&D) has been 
extensively studied.
2
 On the other hand, the previous 
literature has also addressed the effects of public 
aid about productivity and business efficiency.
3–5
 
Finally, other studies have focused on the different 
instruments of public aid to companies. In this 










 stand out. 
Although the literature on public aid to companies 
is extensive, the conclusions of the existing studies 
vary according to the aid instrument, the period time, 
the geographical area, and the stage of the life cycle 
of the beneficiary company. Consequently, there are 
no conclusive results on the economic and social 
effect generated by the company that benefits from 
public funds. Nor is it about the effectiveness of the 
different forms of public aid used by governments.
4,5,14
 
For this reason, the objective of this study is to provide 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of public aid 
instruments for companies. To this end, a comparative 
analysis of four common instruments used by 
governments for public aid (Guarantee loans, Public 
loans, Participative loans, and Loss funds) has been 
designed, and measures of the effects on the efficiency 
of companies have been obtained who have received it. 
Materials and Methods 
To measure efficiency, we use data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), which is a methodology designed to 
evaluate the efficiency of a company concerning for 
to the best companies in a reference group.
15
 In this 
context, efficiency is the ability to produce the 
maximum possible output given a mix of inputs. 
Under the hypothesis of the existence of an optimal 
production function, an efficient frontier of 
production possibilities can be constructed for all 
input mixes. DEA is based on the idea that if a 
production unit can achieve a certain level of output 
from a level of inputs, all other units are in a position 
to do the same or take measures that allow them to 
improve their efficiency. In this way, the most 
efficient firms are closer to the border, and the 
efficiency score is a distance measure of the 








In addition, taking into accountthe theoretical 
advances on DEA that have allowed explicit 
incorporation of the continuous temporal structure in 
the efficiency measurements, the present study uses 
the dynamic DEA measurement (DSBM), according 
to the model expressed in Eq. (1).
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Finally, efficiency estimates are obtained by adding 
   
  
              in the model (1). 
We use model (1) to evaluate efficiency in a 3-year 
window, that is, between the year before the 
transaction (year of injection of public financing) T-1, 
and 2 years after the transaction, T+2. Besides, it has 
also been taken into account that efficiency patterns 
can be specific to each industry, and therefore, we 




To evaluate the implications of the different  
types of public aid on efficiency, a regression model 
has been developed considering the efficiency  
scores, the variables of interest, and a group of  
control variables about age, return on assets (ROA), 
leverage, Herfindahl index, and industry dummies. 
This regression model uses the Wooldridge-Papke 
estimator for coined fractional bound response 
variables, which has no difficulty in recovering the 
regression function for the fractional variable, and no 
need to use ad hoc transformations to handle data at 





Sample and data 
Our sample includes a random selection of  
400 Spanish companies that have received different 
types of public aid in 2016, excluding companies  
in the financial sector. The information on the aid 
received by the companies has been provided by 
ENISA, public innovation company dependent on the 
Government of Spain. The annual financial statements 
of the companies in the sample, the dates of creation, 
and the codes of the industrial sector were obtained 
from the Bureau Van Dijk SABI database. All 
monetary data were adjusted for inflation (the base 
year 2016). The distribution of the sample by industry 
is presented in Table 1. Overall, companies are 
heavily concentrated in the Manufacturing, Building, 
and Chemistry industries (over 48%). 
 
Results & Discussion 
The results of dynamic efficiency estimations is 
reported in Table 2. The table reports a summary of 
the dynamic DEA estimations of efficiency; The 
overall score is the measure of global efficiency from 
T−1 to T+2, with T being the year of companies 
receive public support. Period 0 corresponds to years 
T−1 to T; Periods 1 and 2 are defined accordingly; 
Standard errors are given in brackets. The average 
level of efficiency of the companies in the sample 
during the study period is approximately 0.5152 
(51.52%). The pattern of these improvements seems 
Table 1 — Number of firms per industry in the sample 
 All firms Guarantee Ordinary loan Particip.loan Loss fund 
Industry N % N % N % N % N % 
Farming 18 4.50 8 8.00 2 2.00 2 2.00 6 6.00 
Chemistry 44 11.00 8 8.00 23 23.00 5 5.00 8 8.00 
Manufacturing 81 20.25 11 11.00 40 40.00 18 18.00 12 12.00 
Energy 38 9.50 10 10.00 7 7.00 8 8.00 13 13.00 
Building 68 17.00 16 16.00 11 11.00 19 19.00 22 22.00 
Communications 28 7.00 8 8.00 3 3.00 9 9.00 8 8.00 
Computing 37 9.25 10 10.00 4 4.00 17 17.00 6 6.00 
Consultancy 35 8.75 9 9.00 3 3.00 11 11.00 12 12.00 
Education 26 6.50 11 11.00 3 3.00 6 6.00 6 6.00 
Sport 25 6.25 9 9.00 4 4.00 5 5.00 7 7.00 
 




to be volatile and somewhat convex (Fig. 1), 
indicating that there are significant differences in the 
impact of each public aid instrument on the efficiency 
of companies, and that this impact is greater initially 
and at the end of the analyzed period. The companies 
backed by participative loans are the ones that grow 
the most in efficiency, with an overall increase of 
over 24%. For their part, the companies that have 
received guarantee, public loans, and the loss fund 
increase their efficiency by 6.25%, 4.00%, and 2.20%, 
respectively. This efficiency evolution patterns with 
time of the sample firms between the first pre- and 
second post-transaction years are shown in Fig. 1. 
The regressions estimated using the sample of 400 
companies supported by public aids is presentes in 
Table 3. Model (0) provides results using control 
variables only. Models (1) to (4) test the impact of 
each type of public aid instrument concerning for to 
the general efficiency in the study period. Model (3) 
suggests that the presence of participative loans has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the 
future efficiency of a company. The corresponding 
partial effect (0.1974) implies that the participative 
loans in the capital of the company improve 
efficiency by almost 20% (on average) during the 2 
years after the transaction. Models (1), (2) and (4) 
Table 2 — Summary of dynamic efficiency scores 
 All firms Guarantee Public loans Part. loans Loss fund 
Overall score 0.5152 0.4945  0.5167 0.5436 0.5061 
 (0.3536) (0.3660) (0.3319) (0.3570) (0.3596) 
Period 0 0.4931 0.4807 0.5060 0.4865 0.4994 
 (0.3569) (0.3716) (0.3781) (0.3302) (0.3479) 
Period 1 0.5142 0.4926 0.5198 0.5372 0.5073 
 (0.3490) (0.3432) (0.3025) (0.3392) (0.4114) 
Period 2 0.5384 0.5102 0.5244 0.6072 0.5118 
 (0.3549) (0.3834) (0.3153) (0.4016) (0.3195) 
Observations 400 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 3 — Efficiency regressions 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Constant 8.8091** 2.8809** 4.1624** 2.4023** 4.0370** 2.9327** 
Age, T − 1 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0012 0.0031 −0.0006 
ROA, T − 1  −0.0247**  −0.0212** −0.0348**  −0.0340** −0.0581** −0.0602** 
Leverage, T − 1  −0.1237*  −0.3841* −0.4107*  −0.2440* −0.3821* −0.4299* 
Herfindahl index, T − 1  0.7039*  0.6834*  0.5902**  0.5998* 0.7455  0.4337* 
Industry dummies  0.0104*  0.0187*  0.0294*  0.0187*  0.0214*  0.0388* 
       
Guarantee dummy  −0.0380    −0.0389 
Public loan dummy    0.0487   0.0463 
Part Loan dummy     0.3163*  0.2669* 
Loss fund dummy       0.0398 0.0451 
       
R2 0.1695 0.1695 0.1695 0.2058 0.1767 0.2249 
Observations  400  400  400  400  400  400 
F-test 1.7960  1.4599  1.9002  1.3726  1.6339  1.4783 
Significance  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Durbin W.  1.9472  1.8422  1.9780  1.8938  1.9776  1.9404 
ANOVA  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Mean VIF  1.0833  1.3367  1.2047  1.3066  1.4711  1.2508 
J-B p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity test  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Average partial effects 
  −0.0031     −0.0022 
    0.0153    0.1276 
    0.1974*  0.1740* 
      0.0166 0.0115 
The table reports regressions of efficiency scores; Coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors; ** and * indicate 1% and 5% 
significance, respectively; DW: Durbin Watson test; J-B: Jarque-Bera test 
 




show that the presence of guarantee, public loan, and 
loss fund are not significant to explain the increase  
in efficiency of the companies in the sample. Finally, 
model (6) combines all public aid instruments.  
As expected, participative loans have a statistically 
significant effect on efficiency, although in the 
combined model the effect is at the 17.40% level.  
All regression tests (p-values) reject errors in the 
specification or functional form. 
 
Conclusions 
The present study analyzes the implications of 
public aids on the efficiency of industrial companies. 
In general, the results suggest that in the sample of 
Spanish companies supported by public aids, the 
participative loan is the only instrument that improves 
the efficiency of companies significantly. Comparing 
the support of participative loans to other public aid 
instruments suggests a statistically weak or no effect 
of Guarantee loans, Public loans, and Loss funds on 
the efficiency of companies. 
Our explicit analysis of the public aid instruments 
on business efficiency contributes to the  
ongoing discussions on the effects of public aids  
on efficiency. Rather than focusing on just  
one instrument, our study looks at the causality of 
common public aid instruments in a homogeneous 
context of time and space. 
The results obtained are important for entrepreneurs 
and industrial policymakers. Entrepreneurs must 
understand that public aids provide not only financing 
but also an impact on the economic performance of 
companies. For industrial policymakers, our evidence 
suggests that investments in the form of participatory 
loans are contributing most to the industry's economic 
development goal and that a re-evaluation of public 
aid programs seems necessary. 
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Fig. 1 — Efficiency evolution with time 
 
